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Licensing Restrictions and
Appropriating Market Benefits from
Plant Innovation
Jay P. Kesan ∗
Recent patent cases have come under fire with producers
accused of seeking to maximize profits by undermining
consumers’ rights of sale. 1 Yet in the case of agricultural
biotechnology, its reliance on patent law is more complex because
of the unique reproductive qualities of its products. Some products
require a great deal of technical innovation, but once acquired, they
can be reproduced perfectly and then used or sold by the consumer
without additional cost. At the same time, certain licensing
agreements now prohibit farmers from carrying out long-standing
practices on their farms. These issues have come to the forefront
of patent law, because of cases brought forth by agbiotech firm
Monsanto. 2 This talk addresses intellectual property concerns
posed by licensing restrictions associated with the sale of seed and
the problem of appropriating market benefits from plant
innovation. Among some 1,200 cases that Monsanto has filed
against infringers of its patent claims, only two have progressed
significantly to the Federal Circuit: Monsanto v. McFarling 3 has
been heard in district court and Federal Circuit opinions, and
∗
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Georgetown University School of Law. This article is an edited transcript of the author’s
remarks made at the Fordham Intellectual Property Symposium on November 18, 2005.
John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream Licensing
Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006).
1
See, e.g., John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006).
2
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
3
363 F.3d 1336.
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Monsanto v. Scruggs 4 is still in litigation. In the case of
McFarling, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld
Monsanto’s licensing agreements against Homan McFarling, a
Mississippi farmer. 5
Monsanto is an agricultural firm involved in seed production
and agricultural biotechnology, including the production of
genetically modified seeds. Seed producers, like Monsanto, have
different contractual relationships with different types of farmers:
those who use the seed for food and feed and those who plant it.
For farmers who are seed producers, they enter straight-up, output
contracts, in which Monsanto purchases all the output the farmers
produce. They typically do not involve any patent issues. For
farmers who use the seed primarily for food and feed, they are held
by express license restrictions on seed bags, often referred to as a
“bag-tag license” or a “seed-wrap license.”
Monsanto has brought cases against farmers it believes have
violated its bag-tag licenses. 6 These licenses cover a bag of
genetically modified seed that is insect-resistant, herbicideresistant, or salinity-resistant. The particular gene in the seed that
is susceptible to these factors has been modified. This genetically
modified seed is then sold in a bag with a label, specifying that this
seed can be used to produce food and feed, but cannot be used to
grow more seed for planting. Farmers can plant the seed, but after
harvest they must sell the leftover seed as food or feed; they cannot
replant it.
Even with the bag-tag license, genetically modified seed is
enormously popular: seventy percent of the soybean grown in the
United States is genetically modified. 7 Take, for instance, the
specific example of Roundup Ready seeds from the Monsanto
cases. 8 These seeds have been genetically modified to resist a
particular type of herbicide. If a farmer plants these seeds in the
4

117 Fed. Appx. 729.
McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1338.
6
See, e.g., Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340.
7
Genetically Modified Crops in the United States, Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology, Aug. 2004, http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/display.php3?
FactsheetID=2 (last visited July 22, 2006).
8
Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336.
5
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ground and sprays the farm with herbicides, then the herbicides kill
all the weeds, but not the seeds. The seeds remain unaffected by
the herbicides, because geneticists have located and inhibited the
particular enzyme (EPSPS enzyme) in the seed that is susceptible
to it. Roundup Ready seeds and the herbicide effectively rid the
farm of weeds. Farmers benefit because yields increase. Studies
have been done that show the many benefits of using Roundup
Ready seeds. Therefore, it is not surprising that farmers behave
rationally and want to buy these seeds.
Despite all these benefits, a problem emerges on the producer
side. These Roundup Ready soybeans are self-pollinating; they
breed true and, therefore, replicate perfectly. If a farmer buys a
bag of soybean, then he can continue planting the soybean and
producing perfect samples, almost digital copies, of the genetically
modified seed simply by planting it. He is limited only by his
ability to keep the seed clean and dry during the off-season; in
other words, his ability to store it properly. Hybrid crops, on the
other hand, act differently. If a farmer buys a bag of a genetically
modified hybrid seed, such as corn, he might be able to use it a
second time with some loss, but the third or fourth time, the crop
yield will drop significantly. Hybrid seeds are not self-pollinating;
they have built-in protection for the producer. Therefore, when
producers sell self-pollinating seeds like soybeans, they will have
to act to minimize replanting in order to achieve the same levels of
protection that is built into hybrid seeds. It follows that producers
will price the self-pollinating seed differently taking into account a
certain number of replanting activities.
In the case of genetically modified seed, such price
mechanisms accounting for “brown-bagging” may well result in
pricing the seed too high for farmers. Monsanto, therefore, relies
on the bag-tag licensing restrictions. Nonetheless, consumers are
selling saved seed among themselves in direct infringement of the
licenses. There are roughly 85 million acres of corn and soybean
in the United States, and they are roughly equal to each other.
Taking into account the differences between the amount of seed
that is used in corn and soybean, the amount of soybean sold is
considerably lower—many times lower—than corn. We have to
assume that a significant amount of so-called “brown-bagging”
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takes place to explain the difference. By the way, “brownbagging” refers to farmers selling saved-seed because they sell it in
plain, brown bags.
Does Monsanto have a right to prevent brown-bagging?
Turning to the precedents, we find that the Federal Circuit decided
in the 1992 case of Mallinckrodt that if a patentee goes beyond the
physical or temporal scope of the patent grant, then that is
impermissible. 9 Later in the 1997 case, Braun v. Abbott Labs, the
Federal Circuit provided a few examples of impermissible
restrictions, such as using a patented product to try to control an
un-patented product and going beyond the term of the grant. 10 In
the case of genetically modified seed, we have to look at the
restriction itself and decide whether it is within or outside the
patent grant. 11 Looking at the patent grant complies with some old
Supreme Court cases, like the 1938 case of General Talking
Pictures. 12
Patent rights only apply to that which is described and claimed
in the patent. 13 Once we determine the limits of the statutory
patent grant, then we can determine infringement, because the
crucial point is that farmers cannot practice the patent claims. That
means farmers cannot make, use, sell, or offer to sell a patented
invention without a license. They may buy an article that is
patented. If they buy an article with no restrictions whatsoever
(i.e., an unconditional sale), then they have paid for it and they
have an “implied” license stating that they have obtained the
purchased good free and clear of any restrictions. 14 However, if
they buy an article that is governed by a “bag-tag” or “seed-wrap”
license, then the producer’s licensed right is exhausted, but other
rights are not.
Consumers often have a choice to buy the product with or
without a license. For articles governed by a license, the producer
9

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
11
Id.
12
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
13
See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000).
14
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 484
(1964).
10
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usually charges a lower amount; the consumer can pay a lower
amount for an incomplete set of rights. In the Lexmark case, the
price for re-usable printer cartridges that were governed by a
license requiring the consumer to refill it through Lexmark was
around 20 percent lower than the price of a printer cartridge that
was not governed by a license. 15 If the consumer wants all the
rights, then the consumer can have an unconditional sale and pay a
higher price. Whether or not this price discrimination makes
economic sense, the producers are alienating a different set of
property rights.
Therefore, they should be able to price
differentially. Differential pricing allows many more transactions
to clear in the marketplace than is the case if only unconditional
sales were allowed.
What happens if we do not enforce licenses? Then we force
producers to charge higher prices, and then many transactions
simply do not take place. Mark Patterson cautions us that in
regards to price discrimination, the welfare effects are
ambiguous. 16 The welfare effects of price discrimination become
ambiguous only if we do not properly monitor or control for the
baseline. Consider the situation without price discrimination,
when producers sell seed unconditionally at supra-competitive
prices.
Taking that to be the baseline, allowing price
discrimination across different markets and products permits us to
reduce some deadweight losses leading to an increase in social
welfare. When the supra-competitive price is higher than the
competitive price, those transactions between the competitive price
and the supra-competitive price fail to clear. For example, in an
unconditional sale, if the competitive price in a market for pencils
is two dollars and the patented price is five dollars, then
transactions between two and five dollars do not take place. In
new markets with price discrimination, the product can be sold for
a whole variety of prices corresponding to different uses; a number
of new transactions can take place; a number of new markets are
15

Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 983
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
16
John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006)
(Mark Patterson, panelist).
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created; and the welfare effects are positive when compared with
the alternative.
One may also ask, in the case of seeds, why not permit seed
saving? This is the “God-made-germplasm” argument. The
simple problem is that it is just not true. The value chain in the
modern food sector is enormously complicated. It begins with
start-up agbiotech companies performing a great deal of research
and development in genetics.
University departments of
agricultural-science and agricultural engineering have moved away
from germplasm breeding toward work in genetics. These start-up
agbiotech companies and universities provide their technologies to
large life-science companies and large agriculture-equipment
companies. By the time we arrive at a farmer, we are much farther
along in the value chain. He takes advantage of all the genetically
modified technologies that the start-up agbiotech companies,
universities, and large-life science companies have worked on, and
the benefits that accrue to him do not derive from his labor,
innovation, or investment alone. In addition to genetically
modified crops, the farmer uses new technologically advanced
equipment, which further contributes to his higher yield. For
example, these large agriculture-equipment companies build
combines that are fitted with global positioning system (GPS)
equipment. This equipment allows the farmer to plot crop yields—
the width of the combines times four feet: six-foot-by-four-foot
plots that allow the farmer to gauge precisely what the crop yields
are. A complicated value chain continues downstream from the
farmer: it goes to the grain elevator; from there, it goes to a food
processor and so on; then it finally ends up with buyers/consumers.
We need a system where parties in the value chain in the
modern food sector can share in the risks and benefits of R&D;
then they can coordinate their activities as the product goes
through the value chain, rather than enabling a system where one
player takes all the risk, and another receives all the benefits.
Allowing the farmer to save seed goes back to a simple principle:
he is trying to reap where he did not sow. He is not the only
person who has contributed to the enhanced yield. There are a
number of other players who have done their part and have a right
to get paid and have a right to benefit. We can argue about
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whether the benefit to producers and others is commensurate with
their innovation or not. This is exactly where the debate should be.
For instance, what is covered by the patent claim at issue and what
is not covered by the patent claim?
This rationale may be exclusive to agricultural biotechnology.
The same protection extended to Monsanto may not apply to other
companies, such as Lexmark. In my opinion, the patent issues in
the Lexmark case, involving the illegal reconstruction of printer
cartridges, were not squarely presented. 17 Certain questions arise:
Is this cartridge patented? What, exactly, is patented? What is the
scope of the claim? But in the case of seeds, it is quite different:
you have wholesale reproduction. There is no question that there
is perfect replication. Distinguishing between legal repair and
illegal reconstruction is less problematic when a consumer can recreate the whole genetically modified seed perfectly. Even in
cases such as Aro I and Aro II, the U.S. Supreme Court continues
to uphold that full-scale reconstruction is illegal. 18
Licensing restrictions, likewise, may not work as well for other
industries. Different industries and technological sectors rely on
the patent system to varying extents to appropriate benefits from
their innovations. Some industries use other means, other than
licenses, to reap the benefits of their innovation. Certain industries
employ the first-mover advantage or they rely on network effects
to appropriate benefits from their innovation. Certain software
products lock the consumer in, because the cost of changing to new
software is too high. They may also appropriate benefits through
other means, such as reputational capital, bundling sales and
services, and so forth. These practices, however, do not work for
seed companies. In the case of genetically modified crops that are
self-pollinating, it is as if you bought a CD containing some
software, and the CDs were replicating at night! The software
industry, with their shrink-wrap licenses, would never allow that,
and they have network effects and other practices to help them
prevent customers from doing so. The producers of genetically
modified seeds have no such protection. Hybrid crops, on the
17

Lexmark Int’l, 421 F.3d at 983.
See Aro II, 377 U.S. 476; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro I),
365 U.S. 336 (1961).
18
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other hand, have built-in protection. Therefore, when dealing with
certain kinds of industries (such as agbiotech) and certain kinds of
products (such as self-pollinating crops), producers are dependent
on utility patent protection and enforcement to prevent free-riding
and brown-bagging.
Before I conclude, I want to discuss contractual issues and
intermediaries involved in the Monsanto cases. 19 Then, I will turn
to the role of the legislature in solving these complications and
solutions proposed in other parts of the world. I have glossed over
some contractual issues, in part, because seed producers are
perfecting their notice requirements and contracts. They have
learned from not providing proper notice in the past. Nevertheless,
there are contractual issues, and conflicts have arisen over bag-tag
licensing with intermediaries, like JEM Ag Supply, in the JEM v.
Pioneer case. 20 In JEM v. Pioneer, the litigation came about
because there were thousands and thousands of Pioneer seed bags
that were found in JEM Ag Supply, and every one of these bags
has a unique number to it, and based on those numbers, they found
that JEM Ag Supply had not paid for them. 21 Therefore, the
relationship between some of these retailers and agbiotech firms,
like Monsanto and Pioneer, is strained.
It is common in patent law for producers to sue intermediate
players for contributory infringement and for actively inducing
infringement—Sec. 271(b) and Sec. 271(c)—instead of going after
the direct infringer, because the direct infringer is very often a
customer. The enforcement of licenses becomes problematic for
producers, because it involves suing customers. Most seed
producers admit that they do not want to sue farmers. They are
their ultimate customers, and they have longstanding relationships
with them. Indeed, some of them, such as DuPont-Pioneer, as a
matter of policy, refuse to do so. They may sue seed companies,
but they do not sue farmers. However, Monsanto has gone after
direct customers whereas DuPont-Pioneer has not. 22 In short, there
19

Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
20
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
21
Id. at 124.
22
See, e.g., Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336.
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are other non-patent issues such as customer relations and public
relation concerns that become relevant.
Before turning to solutions proposed in other parts of the
world, let’s consider the role of Congress in determining the
validity and limits of the intellectual property rights of genetically
modified seeds. Sexually reproduced plants are protected by this
sui generis, legislatively created IP regime called the Plant Variety
Protection Act (PVPA). 23 The interface between PVPA and the
Utility Patent Act 24 has caused some confusion. The PVPA
protects only the plant as a whole and, unlike utility patents, allows
exceptions, like the breeding exception and the saving-seed
exception. Utility patents protection, on the other hand, is more
robust: it also covers individual components of the plant and the
methods involved in plant innovation, like the actual
transformation method and how the gene is introduced into the
seed. Compared to the Utility Patent Act, the PVPA provides a
narrow scope of protection.
Despite these differences between the PVPA and the Utility
Patent Act, it has been urged, relying on a preemption argument,
that Congress has acted in this area through the PVPA to provide
IP protection, as in the argument made in J.E.M. v. Pioneer that
went before the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001. 25 J.E.M. claimed
that plant protection had already been provided by the PVPA and,
therefore, utility patents should not be granted for plant
innovation—a preemption argument. 26 Yet the argument did not
succeed. 27 Instead, the Supreme Court held that utility patent
protection is also available for plant innovation. 28 Perhaps
Congress will have to revisit this issue to clearly establish what the
PVPA covers and what it does not and how these two regimes
work together. At present, we find state legislatures becoming
involved and seeking to pass legislation to regulate contractual
practices between seed producers and farmers.
23
24
25
26
27
28

7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2372 (2000).
35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
534 U.S. 124.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
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Other solutions have been proposed in the United Kingdom
and South America that might provide some insight into how to
reward innovators in R&D. 29 Peter Carstensen made an interesting
suggestion about applying the U.K. PVPA in the U.S. 30 He
explained how the U.K. regime allows farmers to save seed by
charging them a fee through the seed cleaner. 31 Most farmers
would like the U.K. regime; however, the U.K. saving-seed regime
only applies to small farmers, i.e., farmers who own less than a
fixed acreage, say less than 150 acres. 32 For example, if a farmer
owns more than 150 acres, then he has to pay the seed producer; he
cannot unconditionally save seed. Therefore, all the big farmers
have to pay and the small farmers do not. Looking at the suits
Monsanto has brought against farmers, we find that Mr. Homan
McFarling was farming 8,000 acres, 33 and Mr. Scruggs was
farming several thousand as well. 34 McFarling was saving 1,500
bushels of soybean—not a small amount. 35 Even under the U.K.
regime, Montano could sue both of these farmers. 36 The PVPA, 37
which is based out of the international UPOV convention, 38 has
certain compulsory exceptions and certain optional exceptions;
hence these differences between countries emerge. Each country
can tailor the UPOV legal regime according to its needs by
choosing or opting out of the optional requirements. 39
Other countries are experimenting with having other people in
the value chain pay the seed producers, other than the farmer.
Argentina, for example, is the mirror image of the United States in
the Southern Hemisphere, where northern Argentina looks like the
southern United States. The crops that grow in northern Argentina
29

See, e.g., Plant Varieties Protection Act, 1997, Ch. 66, § 10 (U.K.).
Richards, supra note 16 (Peter Carstensen, panelist). See also Peter Carstensen,
Post-Sale Restraints via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053 (2006).
31
Carstensen, supra note 30.
32
See Plant Varieties Protection Act 1997, Ch. 66, § 10.
33
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
34
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35
McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339.
36
See Plant Varieties Protection Act, 1997, Ch. 66, § 10 (U.K.).
37
7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2372 (2000).
38
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1961, Paris.
39
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1961, Paris.
30
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are the same as those grown in the southern United States.
Argentina is the second and third producer of soybean and corn in
the world, respectively. 40 They were one of the few countries that
embraced GM crops in the early 1990s. To ensure that the large
life-science companies are paid in this arena, they are
experimenting with imposing taxes on farmers’ crops. 41 We can
argue about whether using taxes makes economic sense or not, but
the purpose is not to impose the burden on the farmer and instead
make others further down the value chain compensate the seed
producers. Brazil is experimenting with payments from elevator
operators—that is, other people, besides the farmer, who benefit
from the higher yields of seed. 42 The purpose is, once again, to
establish mechanisms so that innovators are rewarded by others
who are in a better position perhaps to bear the burden.
Whatever the outcome, a tremendous amount of activity is
likely to be forthcoming in this area, perhaps in the legislatures,
and definitely in the courts. The key issue remains how do you
create a system where you can promote innovation; where you can
share in the risks and benefits of R&D; and, at the same time, try to
create new markets and permit the ability to alienate these much
sought after products throughout society?

40

Agribusiness,
Argentine
Republic
Investment
Promotion
Agency,
http://www.inversiones.gov.ar/sectors_invest.htm (last visited July 22, 2006).
41
U.S.-Latin Accord on GM crops a timely warning for Australia, THE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve04/1174gm.html (last visited
July 22, 2006).
42
Rachel Melcer, Monsanto Sees Sales Rise 22%; Posts Loss of $97 Million, ST LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/2004/
Monsanto-Loses-US$97M7jan04.htm (last visited July 22, 2006).

